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  This paper investigates the effects of government trade policies as well as the rules and 
regulations on smuggling cosmetic products in Iran. The study considers the effects of five 
important factors including high tariffs and bureaucratic procedures, registration process, size 
and expire date, lack of accurate monitoring of distribution channels and government recent 
regulation failure on growth of smuggling cosmetic products in Iran. The proposed study uses 
structural equation modeling to examine the effects of these five components. The results 
indicate a positive and meaningful relationships between four variables including registration 
process (β = 0.84, P-value = 0.000), size and expire date (β = 0.86, P-value = 0.000), high rate 
of tariff (β = 0.88, P-value = 0.000) and government recent regulation failure (β = 0.97, P-value 
= 0.000) on growth of smuggling cosmetic products in Iran. In addition, the study has detected 
a negative and meaningful relationship between lack of accurate monitoring of distribution 
channels and growth of smuggling cosmetic products in Iran (β = -0.18, P-value = 0.000).            
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1. Introduction 
 
Smuggling is one of the common problems among all countries around the world. When it comes to 
smuggling human (Mountz, 2003, 2004; Hartnett & Dawdy, 2013) and drugs (Decker & Chapman, 
2008; Benson & Decker, 2010), most governments do their best to fight against it. However, when it 
comes to smuggling cosmetic products, there are not many expectations from governments since they 
have limited budgets and may not care about the consequences (Bhagwati & Hansen, 1973). Every 
year, Iranian women spend approximately 2.1 billion dollars for cosmetic products, which is about 
29% of middle cosmetic consumption. In other words, any Iranian woman aged 15-45 spends 7$ per 
month for cosmetic stuff. Many Iranian women prefer to use brand products, which are subject to 
high rates of tariff and this motivates some people to smuggle these kinds of products. Fig. 1 shows   1148
an increasing trend on smuggled products confiscated by the government of Iran over the period 
2002-2012.  
 
Fig. 1. Trend of confiscated smuggled cosmetic products 
 
As we can observe from the results of Fig. 1, there is an increasing trend on confiscated smuggled 
cosmetic products. In other words, assuming not much change on custom security rules and 
regulations, we may conclude that demand for cosmetic products has been increased over the past 
few years. We may see similar patterns in other countries for smuggling other products, for instance, 
generic cigarettes lower price elasticity and diminish the effect of formal smuggling in United States 
(Goel, 2012).  Farzanegan (2009) studied the causes and consequences of import/ export smuggling 
and estimated its relative size in Iran over the period 1970-2002. They applied Multiple Indicators–
Multiple Causes (MIMIC) modeling and trade mis-invoicing to calculate the latent variable of 
smuggling. They reported that the penalty rate for smuggling and the quality of economic and 
political institutions could reduce smuggling, while tariffs and black market could increase the 
incentives for illegal trade. More trade openness was associated with bigger illegal trade in the case of 
Iran. On average, they reported that smuggling in Iran was approximately 13% of total trade.  
Martin and Panagariya (1984) provided a general model of smuggling capable of handling both the 
Bhagwati-Hansen kind of illegal trade through illegal entry points, and the Pitt kind of illegal trade 
through legal entry points by concentrating on the latter kind of trade. They considered the risk and 
uncertainty related to illegal activity, treated the real expenses of smuggling as a choice variable of 
the firm, and reported that smuggling, legal trade, and price disparity could coexist as in Pitt. They 
also explained that increased enforcement raises real per unit expenses of smuggling and the domestic 
price of importables but lowered both the absolute quantity and the share of illegal imports in total 
imports. Bruns et al. (2011) and Breuer and Kreuer (2012) explained different connections between 
informal and formal activities and specificities of localities, which people in the mentioned countries 
deploy when attempt to secure their livelihood. Xheneti et al. (2013) explained how the spatial, 
economic, institutional and sociocultural characteristics of a context overlap, dominate or recede at 
various points in time to facilitate/inhibit various forms of entrepreneurial behavior and to encourage 
the involvement of, or empower, different groups of people.  
2. The proposed study  
 
This paper investigates the effects of government trade policies as well as rules and regulations on 
smuggling cosmetic products in Iran. The study considers the effects of five important factors 
including high tariffs and bureaucratic procedures, registration process, size and expire date, lack of 
accurate monitoring of distribution channels and government recent regulation failure on growth of 
smuggling cosmetic products in Iran. The population of this study includes all people who live in city 
of Tehran, Iran. Therefore, the sample size is calculated as follows, 
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where N is the sample size,  q p  1 represents the probability,  2 /  z is CDF of normal distribution and 
finally   is the error term. For our study we assume 96 . 1 , 5 . 0 2 /    z p and e=0.05, the number of 
sample size is calculated as N=384. The proposed study uses structural equation modeling to examine 
the effects of these five components. The study designed a questionnaire with 28 questions consists of 
five categories including high tariffs and bureaucratic procedures, registration process, size and 
expire date, lack of accurate monitoring of distribution channels and government recent regulation 
failure on growth of smuggling cosmetic products in Iran. Therefore, there are five hypotheses 
associated with the proposed study as follows, 
 
1.  High tariffs and bureaucratic procedures of cosmetic products influence on growth of 
smuggling cosmetic products in Iran. 
2.  Registration process of cosmetic products influence on growth of smuggling cosmetic 
products in Iran. 
3.  Size and expire date of cosmetic products influence on growth of smuggling cosmetic 
products in Iran. 
4.  Lack of accurate monitoring of distribution channels of cosmetic products influence on 
growth of smuggling cosmetic products in Iran. 
5.  Government recent regulation failure on growth of smuggling cosmetic products influence on 
growth of smuggling cosmetic products in Iran. 
 
All questions of the survey have been arranged in Likert scale and Table 1 summarizes some basic 
statistics such as mean, standard deviation, etc. 
 
Table 1 
The summary of some basic statistics 
Variable  Min  Max  Skewness C.R. Kurtosis  C.R.
n2   1.000   5.000   -.341 -1.898 -.314   -.874
n1  1.000  5.000  -.055 -.305 -.708  -1.971
sh5   1.000   5.000   -.448 -2.492 -.280   -.779
sh4  1.000  5.000  -.133 -.742 -.208  -.578
sh3   1.000   5.000   .196 1.089 -.664   -1.849
sh2  1.000  5.000  -.741 -4.128 .542  1.508
sh1   1.000   5.000   -.211 -1.173 -.539   -1.501
a4  1.000  5.000  .218 1.215 -.727  -2.024
a3   1.000   5.000   -.360 -2.006 -.409   -1.139
a2  1.000  5.000  -.150 -.835 -.196  -.546
a1   1.000   5.000   -.585 -3.259 -.298   -.830
s6  2.000  5.000  -.646 -3.594 -.450  -1.252
s5   1.000   5.000   -.768 -4.275 -.111   -.310
s4  1.000  5.000  -.467 -2.598 -.686  -1.910
s3   1.000   5.000   -.661 -3.680 .143   .398
s2  1.000  5.000  -.460 -2.559 .146  .408
s1   1.000   5.000   -.555 -3.088 -.114   -.318
t8  1.000  5.000  -.178 -.989 -.255  -.710
t7   1.000   5.000   -.639 -3.557 .105   .292
t6  1.000  5.000  -.800 -4.452 .316  .880
t5   1.000   5.000   -.914 -5.089 .647   1.801
t4  1.000  5.000  -.295 -1.640 -.514  -1.430
t3   1.000   5.000   -.776 -4.322 .941   2.620
t2  1.000  5.000  -.779 -4.336 .413  1.149
t1   1.000   5.000   -1.004 -5.589 .908   2.528
Multivariate    58.506  10.858
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The results of Table 1 indicate that the data were not normally distributed and therefore we remove 
some of the unusual numbers from the survey and repeat the calculation until we reach some 
normally distributed data. We have used structural equation modeling to verify the hypotheses of the 
survey and Fig. 2 shows the results of our findings. 
 
 
Fig. 2. The results of structural equation modeling in standard form  
 
Investigating various statistical test such RMSEA, GFI, etc. have indicated that the results of 
structural equation modeling are valid. In addition, all statistical tests are meaningful when the level 
of significance is five percent. 
 
4. Discussion and conclusion 
 
The proposed study has applied structural equation modeling to study the effects of these five 
components. The results of Fig. 2 have indicated a positive and meaningful relationships between 
four variables including registration process (β = 0.84, P-value = 0.000), size and expire date (β = 
0.86, P-value = 0.000), high rate of tariff (β = 0.88, P-value = 0.000) and government recent 
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regulation failure (β = 0.97, P-value = 0.000) on growth of smuggling cosmetic products in Iran. In 
addition, the study has detected a negative and meaningful relationship between lack of accurate 
monitoring of distribution channels and growth of smuggling cosmetic products in Iran (β = -0.18, P-
value = 0.000).  The results of our investigation are somewhat consistent with other similar results 
(Aasness & Nygård, 2014).  Gordoncillo et al. (2013) investigated the effect of anti-smuggling 
policies for selected agricultural commodities in the Philippines and reported that government rules 
and regulations could help reduce smugelling. Che and Benson (2014) for instance, emphasized that 
strict rules and regulations could reduce smuggling drugs.  According to Grewcock (2014) and 
Nethery and Gordyn (2014) Australia's punitive border policing regime, targeted at deterring asylum 
seekers trying un-authorized entry into this country, was ratcheted up in 2013 by the former Labor-
led government and its successor, the Liberal National Party Coalition. Under the guise of fighting 
'people-smuggling', and a pledge to 'Stop the Boats', policies such as the mandatory detention of 
unauthorized arrivals and the implementation of off-shore detention facilities have been made even 
more draconian.       
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